基于数理模型分析的保险业道德风险规避方法研(3)

发布时间:2021-06-09

ABSTRACT

ABSTRACT

Withthedevelopmentofourcountyinsuranceindustry,there

asaremanyproblemsintheinsuranceagentmarket,suchmakinginsincereinsurancepolicies,concealing

SOtheinsuredrisk,misleadinganddeceivingtheinsuredand

seriouslyaffectedthehealthydevelopmentoftheon.11lemoralhazardhasiILqOranC.圮industry,bccauseinsurance

achievementbutthequantityofagentjustdoesnotworkhardforthequalityof

achievement,and

OntheonemegaUyworkforshort termbenefit.hand,thesystematic

theroasollisthatthebenefitisdifferentandtheinformationisasymm哪in

waysprincipal—agentsystemwhichisconstructedreasonbytheisthatinsurerandtheinsBranceagent.Ontheotherhand.thetechnicalunsuitablemanagementaleadopted.

Inordertosolvemoralhazardthequestion,thePrincipal—agentmodelandthe

incentivemechanismisestablishedandanalysed.Tobeclassifiedforthemoralhazard

intheinsuranceagentindustry,thesingIe-timeandthemulti-timesthePrincipal—agent

modelareestablished.Forthesin91.e-timeincentivecontractwiththe“con仃ibuti011

Principal agent

incentivefactorareefectedratio'’.fourmodela∞established.The‘‘contributionratio”andthetogetherforthemoralhazard.Thecharacteristicofthe

optimumincentive

“10SSratio”.thecontractisanalysed.Forthemulti-timesincentivealecontractwiththevarioustimescontractscontactedwim

typeandthethe“lossratio”.themulti-timesincentivecontractaretheauto-adaptedmemorable,thetwo

moralhazardareavoided.

Keywords:moralhazard,incentivemechanism,pdncipal agent,insuranco

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