基于数理模型分析的保险业道德风险规避方法研(3)
发布时间:2021-06-09
发布时间:2021-06-09
ABSTRACT
ABSTRACT
Withthedevelopmentofourcountyinsuranceindustry,there
asaremanyproblemsintheinsuranceagentmarket,suchmakinginsincereinsurancepolicies,concealing
SOtheinsuredrisk,misleadinganddeceivingtheinsuredand
seriouslyaffectedthehealthydevelopmentoftheon.11lemoralhazardhasiILqOranC.圮industry,bccauseinsurance
achievementbutthequantityofagentjustdoesnotworkhardforthequalityof
achievement,and
OntheonemegaUyworkforshort termbenefit.hand,thesystematic
theroasollisthatthebenefitisdifferentandtheinformationisasymm哪in
waysprincipal—agentsystemwhichisconstructedreasonbytheisthatinsurerandtheinsBranceagent.Ontheotherhand.thetechnicalunsuitablemanagementaleadopted.
Inordertosolvemoralhazardthequestion,thePrincipal—agentmodelandthe
incentivemechanismisestablishedandanalysed.Tobeclassifiedforthemoralhazard
intheinsuranceagentindustry,thesingIe-timeandthemulti-timesthePrincipal—agent
modelareestablished.Forthesin91.e-timeincentivecontractwiththe“con仃ibuti011
Principal agent
incentivefactorareefectedratio'’.fourmodela∞established.The‘‘contributionratio”andthetogetherforthemoralhazard.Thecharacteristicofthe
optimumincentive
“10SSratio”.thecontractisanalysed.Forthemulti-timesincentivealecontractwiththevarioustimescontractscontactedwim
typeandthethe“lossratio”.themulti-timesincentivecontractaretheauto-adaptedmemorable,thetwo
moralhazardareavoided.
Keywords:moralhazard,incentivemechanism,pdncipal agent,insuranco
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