不完全信息时高考志愿博弈(19)

不完全信息时高考博弈分析

Journal of Economic Theory ,2007, Forthcoming

[11] Haluk Ergin, Tayfun Sonmez, “Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism” ,

Journal of Public Economics，2006, 90，215-237

[12] Gale, David; Shapley, Lloyd, “College admissions and the stability of marriage” , American

Mathematical Monthly, 1962, 69(1): 9-15

[13] Fuhito Kojima, “Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism with General Priority

Structures”, 2006, Mimeo,

[14] D. Majumdar and A. Sen， “Ordinally Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Voting Rules”,

Econometrica, 2004，72, 523-540

[15] Majumdar，Dipjyoti，2007， “Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matchings”，

Mimeo， [16] 聂海峰a，“高考录取机制的博弈分析”,《经济学季刊》,2007年第6卷第3期（总25

期），第899－916页 [17] 聂海峰b，“考得好不如报得好么——高考志愿填报博弈研究？”《南方经济》,2007年

第7期，第23-36页

[18] Roth, A. E., “The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case

study in game theory”; Journal. Political. Economy, 1984,Vol. 92, 991-1016

[19] Roth, A.E., “Two-Sided Matching with Incomplete Information about Others’ Preferences”,

Games and Economic Behavior, 1989, Vol. 1, 191-209

[20] Roth, A.E., "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry Level Labor Markets:

Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the U.K.," American Economic Review, 1991, vol. 81, 415-440.

[21] Roth, A. E., “The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimental economics and

computation as tools of design economics”, Econometrica, 2004,Vol. 70, p1341-1378

[22] A.E. Roth and U. Rothblum, “Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets- In Search of

Advice for Participants”, Econometrica， 1999, 67, 21-43 (1999).

[23] Roth, A. E., Sotomayor, M., Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game Theoretic Modeling and

Analysis , Cambridge University. Press, London/New York，1990, [24] 钟笑寒、程娜、何云帆，“花落谁家 ——高考志愿填报机制的博弈模型”，《经济学季刊》，

2004，第3卷第3期（总第11期），763--778