企业核心竞争力

看起来不同如复印机、 激光打印机、 照相机和图像扫描仪。 飞利浦工作 15 年以上完善职权光介质 （激光光盘） 而合营公司中建立在录像中的领先地位。 核心能力的其他例子可能包括 mechantronics （结婚机械和电子工程的能力）、 视频显示、 生物工程和微电子。 在其能力建设的早期阶段飞利浦不会想到会的职权光介质产生的所有产品也不能合营公司预期微型摄像机第一天就开始探索录像带技术。

Unlike the battle for global brand dominance, which is visible in the world's broadcast and print media and is aimed at building global "share of mind,” the battle to build world class competencies is invisible to people who aren't deliberately looking for it. Top management often tracks the cost and quality of competitors' products, yet how many managers untangle the web of alliances their Japanese competitors have constructed to acquire competencies at low cost? In how many Western boardrooms is there an explicit, shared understanding of the competencies the company must build for world leadership? Indeed, how many senior executives discuss the crucial distinction between competitive strategy at the level of a business and competitive strategy at the level of an entire company? 与不同的是在世界上的广播和打印介质中可见，旨在建设全球"分享的心"的全球品牌优势之战看不到不刻意寻找的人建立世界类能力的战斗。 最高管理层通常用于跟踪成本和质量的竞争对手的产品，但多少经理理清联盟网站日本对手建造获得低成本的能力吗？ 在多少西方会议室有明确、 共享理解能力的公司必须建立世界领导吗？ 事实上，多少高级行政人员讨论业务一级的竞争战略与整个公司一级的竞争战略之间的关键区别？

Let us be clear. Cultivating core competence does not mean outspending rivals on research and development. In 1983, when Canon surpassed Xerox in worldwide unit market share in the copier business, its R&D budget in reprographics was but a small fraction of Xerox's. Over the past 20 years, NEC has spent less on R&D as a percentage of sales than almost all of its American and European competitors. 让我们是清楚的。 培育核心竞争力并不意味着 outspending 研究和发展的竞争对手。 当佳能超过富士施乐在世界范围内的单元的市场份额，复印机业务的 1983 年复印在其研发预算是但施乐的一小部分。 在过去 20 年 NEC 已用了减少对研发的销售比几乎所有的美国和欧洲的竞争对手一个百分比。

Nor does core competence mean shared costs, as when two or more SBUs use a common facility a plant, service facility, or sales force or share a common component. The gains of sharing may be substantial, but the search for shared costs is typically a post hoc effort to rationalize production across existing businesses, not a premeditated effort to build the competencies out of which the businesses themselves grow. 也没有核心竞争力并表示分担的费用，如当两个或多个 SBUs 使用常见的设施一厂、 服务设施或销售力或共享共同的组件。 共享的收益可能会很大，但搜索的分担费用通常是事后努力使生产合理化跨现有业务不是一种有预谋的努力，建立自己的业务增长其中的能力。

Building core competencies is more ambitious and different than integrating vertically, moreover. Managers deciding whether to make or buy will start with end products and look upstream to the efficiencies of the supply chain and downstream toward distribution and customers. They do not take inventory of skills and look forward to applying them in nontraditional ways. (Of course, decisions about competencies do provide a logic for vertical integration. Canon is not particularly integrated in its copier business, except in those aspects of the vertical chain that Support the competencies it regards as critical.) 建立核心能力是更加雄心勃勃和不同于集成垂直，此外。 管理人员决定是否进行或买将开始与结束的产品，并查找分布和客户对上游供应链和下游的效率。 他们不要采取技能清单并期待应用在非传统的方法中。 （的当然决定的能力