企业核心竞争力

thinking was behind JVC's decision in the mid 1970s to establish VCR supply relationships with leading national consumer electronics companies in Europe and the United States. In supplying Thomson, Thorn, and Telefunken (all independent companies at that time) as well as U.S. partners, JVC was able to gain the cash and the diversity of market experience that ultimately enabled it to outpace Philips and Sony. (Philips developed videotape competencies in parallel with JVC, but it failed to build a worldwide network of OEM relationships that would have allowed it to accelerate the refinement of its videotape competence through the sale of core products.) 若要维持其所选择的核心能力领域的领导，这些公司寻求最大限度地在核心产品世界制造份额。 各种不同的外部和内部客户的核心产品研制产生收入和市场反馈，至少部分用于确定哪些核心可以加强和扩展能力的步伐。 这一思想是合营公司的决定，在 1970 年代中期设立 VCR 提供领先的国家消费电子公司在欧洲和美国的关系。 供应汤姆逊、 刺，和德律风根 （当时的所有独立公司），以及美国伙伴合营公司得以获得现金和市场经验，最终使它超过了菲利浦和索尼的多样性。 （飞利浦开发与合营公司，同时录像带能力但它无法生成的就让它加速通过核心产品销售的录像带权限细化的 OEM 关系的全球网络。

JVC's success has not been lost on Korean compames like Goldstar, Sam Sung, Kia, and Daewoo, who are building core product leadership in areas as diverse as displays, semiconductors, and automotive engines through their OEM supply contracts with Western companies. Their avowed goal is to capture investment initiative away from potential competitors, often U.S. companies. In doing so, they accelerate their competence building efforts while "hollowing out" their competitors. By focusing on competence and embedding it in core products, Asian competitors have built up advantages in component markets first and have then leveraged off their superior products to move downstream to build brand share. And they are not likely to remain the low cost suppliers forever. As their reputation for brand leadership is consolidated, they may well gain price leadership. Honda has proven this with its Acura line, and other Japanese car makers are following suit. 不像金星、 三宋、 起亚和大宇，建筑在显示、 半导体和通过其 OEM 供应合同的汽车发动机等不同的领域领导核心产品与西方公司韩国 compames 上失去了合营公司的成功。 他们宣称的目标是捕获从潜在的竞争者往往美国公司投资倡议。 这样做他们加快建设努力"独木舟"其竞争对手的同时其权限。 能力为重点，并将其嵌入在核心产品亚洲竞争对手第一次建立了组件市场的优势，然后利用其优质的产品，将移动到生成品牌共享的下游关闭。 而且，它们不可能永远保持低成本的供应商。 随着整合了其品牌领导的声誉，他们也可能会获得价格领导。 本田已证明这是与它的极品行和其他汽车制造商效仿。

Control over core products is critical for other reasons. A dominant position in core products allows a company to shape the evolution of applications and end markets. Such compact audio disc related core products as data drives and lasers have enabled Sony and Philips to influence the evolution of the computer peripheral business in optical media storage. As a company multiplies the number of application arenas for its core products, it can consistently reduce the cost, time, and risk in new product development. In short, well targeted core products can lead to economies of scale and scope. 出于其他原因，有关键核心产品的管制。 在核心产品的主导地位使形状应用程序的演变和结束市场的公司。 这种结构紧凑的音频光盘相关核心产品作为数据驱动器和激光器已启用索尼和飞利浦光介质存储计算机外围设备业务的演化的影响。 作为一家公司增加了其核心产品的应用领域的数目可以一直减少成本、 时间和新产品开发中的风险。 在短期目标明确的核心产品可能会导致规模经济和范围。

Two Concepts of the Corporation: 该公司的两个概念：

SBU or Core Competence SBU 或核心竞争力