企业核心竞争力

existing businesses. In the 1970s and 1980s, many American and European companies like GE, Motorola, GTE, Thom, and GEC chose to exit the color television business, which they regarded as mature. If by "mature" they meant that they had run out of new product ideas at precisely the moment global rivals had targeted the TV business for entry, then yes, the industry was mature. But it certainly wasn't mature in the sense that all opportunities to enhance and apply video based competencies had been exhausted. 失去的另一种方法放弃现有业务的建立不断变化的能力的机会。 七十年代与八十年代成熟了很多美国和欧洲公司，像 GE、 摩托罗拉、 低、 同，和通用选择退出他们视为的颜色电视业务。 如果通过"成熟"他们就意味着他们已经在正是全球竞争对手了有针对性的条目的电视业务的时刻运行出的新产品的想法，然后，业界是成熟。 但肯定不是成熟用尽了所有的机会，提高并应用视频的基于的能力的意义上。 In ridding themselves of their television businesses, these companies failed to distinguish between divesting the business and destroying their video media based competencies. They not only got out of the TV business but they also closed the door on a whole stream of future opportunities reliant on video based competencies. The television industry, considered by many U.S. companies in the 1970s to be unattractive, is today the focus of a fierce public policy debate about the inability of U.S. corporations to benefit from the $20 billion a year opportunity that HDTV will represent in the mid to late 1990s. Ironically, the U.S. government is being asked to fund a massive research project in effect, to compensate U.S. companies for their failure to preserve critical core competencies when they had the chance. 在消除自己的电视业务，未能归属业务和销毁其视频媒体区别这些公司根据能力。 他们不只走出电视业务，但他们也对未来的机会依赖于视频的基于能力的整个流把门关上。 被认为很多美国公司在七十年代是不吸引人的电视业今天是关于美国公司无法从 20 亿元高清晰度电视将会代表在的年机会中获益的激烈的公共政策辩论的焦点，年年中至 1990 年代后期。 讽刺的是，被要求美国政府实际上资金大量研究项目，以补偿他们未能时他们有机会保留关键核心能力的美国公司。 In contrast, one can see a company like Sony reducing its emphasis on VCRs (where it has not been very successful and where Korean companies now threaten), without reducing its commitment to video related competencies. Sony's Betamax led to a debacle. But it emerged with its videotape recording competencies intact and is currently challenging Matsushita in the 8mm camcorder market. 在相反，人们可以看到像索尼公司，而不会降低其视频相关能力的承诺减少重点放在摄像机 （在它不是非常成功和韩国公司现在威胁）。 索尼 Betamax 导致一溃逃时。 但它出现其录像带录制能力保持不变，当前挑战松下 8 毫米便携式摄像机市场。

There are two clear lessons here. First, the costs of losing a core competence can be only partly calculated in advance. The baby may be thrown out with the bath water in divestment decisions. Second, since core competencies are built through a process of continuous improvement and enhancement that may span a decade or longer, a company that has failed to invest in core competence building will find it very difficult to, enter an emerging market, unless, of course, it will be content simply to serve as a distribution channel. 有两个明显的教训。 首先，失去核心竞争力的成本可以仅部分计算提前。 婴儿可能会引发带洗澡水中分拆出售的决定。 第二，由于核心能力构建的持续改进和增强，可能会跨越了十年的过程或再，未能在核心能力建设投资的公司会发现它很难，输入一个新兴的市场除非当然，将内容只是为了作为分销渠道。 American semiconductor companies like Motorola learned this painful lesson when they elected to forgo direct participation in the 256k generation of DRAM chips. Having skipped this round, Motorola, like most of its American competitors, needed a large infusion of technical help from