企业核心竞争力

述的全球领导地位的战斗是进行的核心竞争力、 核心产品和最终产品的三个不同的平面。 公司已知道它是打赢还是失去每架飞机。 按投资的纯粹的重量，一家公司可能能打败对手为蓝色天空的技术，但仍会失去建立领导核心能力竞赛。 如果一家公司赢得建立核心能力 （相对于建设中几个技术领导) 竞赛，它几乎肯定会超过新业务发展的竞争对手。 如果一家公司赢得竞争的核心产品份额世界制造，它可能会超过竞争对手在改进产品功能和性价比。

Determining whether one is winning or losing end product battles is more difficult because measures of product market share do not necessarily reflect various companies' underlying competitiveness. Indeed, companies that attempt to build market share by relying on the competitiveness of others, rather than investing in core competencies and world core-product leadership, may be treading on quicksand. In the race for global brand dominance, companies like 3M, Black & Decker, Canon, Honda, NEC, and Citicorp have built global brand umbrellas by proliferating products out of their core competencies. This has allowed their individual businesses to build image, customer loyalty, and access to distribution channels. 确定一个是赢得的还是失去最终产品的战斗是更难的因为产品市场占有率的措施并不一定反映各公司基础竞争力。 事实上，尝试生成市场的公司依靠他人，竞争力共享而不投资的核心能力及世界核心产品领导可能踩流沙。 全球品牌优势局竞选的公司 （如 3 米、 黑科技德克尔、 佳能、 本田、 NEC 和花旗的增殖细胞核的产品，其核心能力的建立了全球品牌雨伞。 这使他们建立形象、 客户忠诚度和分销渠道获得的个人业务。

When you think about this reconceptualization of the corporation, the primacy of the SBU an organizational dogma for a generation is now clearly an anachronism. Where the SBU is an article of faith, resistance to the seductions of decentralization can seem heretical. In many companies, the SBU prism means that only one plane of the global competitive battle, the battle to put competitive products on the shelf today, is visible to top management. What are the costs of this distortion? 当你想到此重新法团时，一个组织的教条的一代 SBU 的首要地位现在显然是不合时宜。 在 SBU 有一个信条的权力下放诱惑耐看起来是邪教。 在许多公司中 SBU 棱镜意味着全球竞争场战役战斗今天把架子上的竞争对手的产品，只有一个平面，对于最高管理层是可见的。 这种扭曲行为的成本是什么？

Under investment in Developing Core Competencies and Core Products. When the organization is conceived of as a multiplicity of SBUs, no single business may feel responsible for maintaining a viable position in core products nor be able to justify the investment required to build world leadership in some core competence. In the absence of a more comprehensive view imposed by corporate management, SBU managers will tend to under invest. Recently, companies such as Kodak and Philips have recognized this as a potential problem and have begun searching for new organizational forms that will allow them to develop and manufacture core products for both internal and external customers. 根据发展的核心竞争力和核心产品的投资。 当组织的构想，是繁多的 SBUs 时，没有单一的业务可能觉得负责维持核心产品中的一个可行的位置，也能够证明构建世界领导的一些核心竞争力所需的投资。 如果没有一个更全面的视图所施加的企业管理 SBU 管理人员会根据投资。 最近，如柯达和飞利浦公司承认这是一个潜在的问题，并开始寻找新的组织形式，使他们能够开发和生产的内部和外部客户的核心产品。 SBU managers have traditionally conceived of competitors in the same way they've seen themselves. On the whole, they've failed to note the emphasis Asian competitors were placing on building leadership in core products or to understand the critical linkage between world manufacturing leadership and the ability to sustain development pace core competence. They've