1.Introduction

GoogleInc.,currentlyoneofthemostpopularcompanies,recentlywentpublic.Itsinitialpublico ering(IPO)processhasgeneratedmuchdebateamonganalysts,investorsandthelike.Twoofthemanyissuesdiscussedaremostinterestingfromtheperspectiveofindustrialeconomics.OneconcernsGoogle’snewIPOmechanismandtheotherisitsbusinessmodel.

InsteadoffollowingthecustomaryIPOprocess,Googleusedanauctionmecha-nism,calledDutchauction(oruniform-priceauction),toallocateitsequityshares.TheusualIPOmechanisminvolvesagroupofinvestmentbankshelpingthecompanytosetaprice,typicallylow,andinitiallyallocatingsharestotheirpreferredclients(mostlyinstitutionalclientssuchaspensionandmutualfunds,andinsurancecom-panies)inexchangeforhighfees.Smallinvestorsrarelygetachancetobuysharesinthisprocess.Undertheauctionmechanism,investors(smallorlarge)submitbidsspecifyingapriceandaquantitydesired.Thepriceisultimatelydeterminedbydemand(thesumofallbids)andsupply.Thismarketclearingpriceshouldinprin-ciplebehigherthantheonesetbyinvestmentbanks,raisingmoremoneythanthetraditionalmechanisms.Anauctionalsoallowsthecompanytoopenits otationtoabroadbaseofindividualshareholdersandpotentiallypreventsasuddenpriceriseonthe rstdayoftradingthatoftenoccursfollowingthetraditionalIPOs.Ontheotherhand,theremaybecaveatstotheauctionmechanismtooifitisnotimple-mentedcarefully.Thecompanyandinvestorsneedtobewaretheriskofbiddingaswellasthepresenceofthe“winner’scurse”associatedwiththeauctionmechanism.1IstheDutchauctionabettermechanismforIPOsthanthetraditionalones?Howtoimproveauctiondesignandreducetheimpactofthewinner’scurse?

OnthebusinesssideGoogle’smodelpresentsmanyinterestingfeatures,oneofwhichrelatestoGoogle’stwodistinctgroupsofcustomers:itsusersandadvertise-mentsponsors.WhileitsWebsiteandsearchenginearefreeforallusers,GooglegetsmostofitsrevenuefromInternetadvertisingprimarilythroughsponsoredlinksthatcomeupwithanysearchbyusers.Asaplatformprovider,Googlebringsthese

Intheirarticle“GoogleShouldBewarethe‘Winner’sCurse’,”FinancialTimes,May3,2004,three-and-a-halfmonthsbeforeGooglewentpublic,EricBudishandPaulKlempererpointedoutthedangerofitsDutchauctiondesignandtheriskoftheWinner’sCurse.Anothereconomist,BarryNalebu ,warnedthatitmightnotbeintheinvestors’bestinteresttoparticipateinGoogle’sauctiongame,notjustbecauseoftheWinner’sCursebutalsobecauseGooglehastheadvantageofgettingtoseeallthebidsbeforedecidingwhentoendtheauction;see“GoingOnce?GoingTwice?LetitGo...”,WashingtonPost,August8,2004.Inanauctionenvironmentwherebiddershavetheirownestimatesofacommonbutunknownvalueoftheitemforsale,thebidderwhomostoverestimatesthevaluewilltendtowinintheauction.Arationalbiddershouldtakethisintoaccountandavoidthewinner’scursebycurtailingtheirbid.1