Social cognitive theory of moral thought and action

Human morality is an issue of considerable import both individually and collectively. Internalization of a set of standards is integral to the achievement of self-directedness and a sense of continuity and purpose in one's everyday life. In the absence of

SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY OF MORAL THOUGHT AND ACTION

Albert Bandura

Stanford University

Bandura, A. (1991). Social cognitive theory of moral thought and action. In W. M. Kurtines & J.

L. Gewirtz (Eds.), Handbook of moral behavior and development (Vol. 1, pp. 45-103).Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Human morality is an issue of considerable import both individually and collectively. Internalization of a set of standards is integral to the achievement of self-directedness and a sense of continuity and purpose in one's everyday life. In the absence of

Human morality is an issue of considerable import both individually and collectively.Internalization of a set of standards is integral to the achievement of self-directedness and asense of continuity and purpose in one's everyday life. In the absence of personal standards andthe exercise of self-regulatory influence, people would behave like weathervanes, constantlyshifting direction to conform with whatever is expedient at a given moment. A shared morality,of course, is vital to the humane functioning of any society. Many forms of behavior are

personally advantageous but are detrimental to others or infringe on their rights. Without someconsensual moral codes people would disregard each others' rights and welfare whenever theirdesires come into social conflict. Societal codes and sanctions articulate collective moral

imperatives as well as influence social conduct. However, external sanctions are relatively weakdeterrents because most transgressive acts can go undetected. But people continuously presideover their own conduct in countless situations presenting little or no external threat. So theexercise of self-sanction must play a central role in the regulation of moral conduct. Self-

regulatory mechanisms form an integral part of the conception of moral agency presented in thischapter.

Most of the recent psychological interest in the domain of morality has centered on

analyses of moral thought. The conspicuous neglect of moral conduct reflects both the

rationalistic bias of many theories of morality and the convenience of investigatory method. It isconsiderably easier to examine how people reason about hypothetical moral dilemmas than tostudy their actual moral conduct. People suffer from the wrongs done to them however

perpetrators might justify their inhumane actions. The mechanisms governing the self-regulationof moral conduct involve much more than moral thought. Even the moral thought is not solely anintrapsychic affair. The way in which moral principles are .bp applied in coping with diversemoral dilemmas varies, depending on situational imperatives, activity domains and

constellations of social influence. It is not uncommon for sophisticated moral justifications tosubserve inhumane endeavors.

A comprehensive theory of morality must explain how moral reasoning, in conjunctionwith other psychosocial factors, governs moral conduct. Social cognitive theory adopts aninteractionist perspective to moral phenomena. Within this conceptual framework, personalfactors in the form of moral thought and affective self-reactions, moral conduct, and

environmental factors all operate as interacting determinants that influence each other

bidirectionally. Before presenting the social cognitive theory of morality, the cognitive structuralconception will be analyzed briefly.

Stage Theories of Moral Reasoning

Stage theorists assume that different types of moral thinking appear in an invariant stagesequence from one uniform way of thinking to another. Piagetian theory (1948) favors adevelopmental sequence progressing from moral realism, in which rules are seen as

unchangeable and conduct is judged in terms of damage done, to relativistic morality in whichconduct is judged primarily by the performer's intentions. In the latter stage, well-intentionedacts that produce much harm are viewed as less reprehensible than ill-intentioned acts that causelittle harm. Moral absolutism stems from unquestioning acceptance of adult prescripts and theegocentric outlook of young children; moral relativism develops from increasing personalexperiences and reciprocal relationships with peers.

Following the lead of Piaget, Kohlberg developed an expanded cognitive structural

theory of morality that revitalized and altered the direction of the field. Kohlberg (1969; 1976)

Human morality is an issue of considerable import both individually and collectively. Internalization of a set of standards is integral to the achievement of self-directedness and a sense of continuity and purpose in one's everyday life. In the absence of

postulates a six-stage sequential typology of moral rules, beginning with punishment-based

obedience, evolving through opportunistic self-interest, approval-seeking conformity, respect forauthority, contractual legalistic observance, and culminating in principled morality based onstandards of justice. Changes in the standards of moral reasoning are produced by cognitiveconflict arising from exposure to higher levels of moral reasoning. Because the stages constitutea fixed developmental sequence, individuals cannot acquire a given form of moral reasoningwithout first acquiring each of the preceding modes of reasoning in order. The presumption isthat exposures to moral reasoning that are too discrepant from one's dominant stage have littleimpact because they are insufficiently understood to activate any changes. Judgmental standardsof lesser complexity are similarly rejected because they have already been displaced in attainingmore advanced …… 此处隐藏：62296字，全部文档内容请下载后查看。喜欢就下载吧 ……