Unit 3

(Para. 1)

最近一场模拟美国遭受毁灭性网络攻击的演习急需布鲁斯·威利斯（曾在小电脑客马特福斯特的专业帮助下，打破了一个异国客天衣无缝的电脑系统入侵计划）这样的一个具有高精尖电脑技术的人的帮助：由于一系列神秘的攻击，国家基础设施陷入瘫痪，包括航空运输，金融市场，甚至是基本的电子通信。

If this was not bad enough, an unrelated electricity outage took down whatever remained of the already unplugged East Coast.

如果这还不够糟糕，那么一段与神秘攻击毫不相干的电力断供期的出现，让已经无电力供应的东部沿海地区停止运转。

(Para. 2)The simulation—funded by a number of major players in network security,

这次模拟实验是由一群网络安全领域的专家支持的，并在两党联立政策中心——华盛顿智囊团的组织下进行的，于一个星期六的晚上在CNN广播公布。它引来了始料未及的烦恼。

The American government appeared incompetent, indecisive and confused (past government officials, including former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff and former Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, were recruited to play this glamorous role on TV). “The U.S. is unprepared for cyberwar,” the simulation s organizers grimly concluded. 美国政府显得不够胜任，不够关注并且有些管理混乱。（历来的政府官员，包括前任国家安全部秘书迈克儿·舍特奥夫，前任州政府秘书代理人乃格尔包特都加入模拟实战通过电视宣传它的重要作用）模拟的组织者们坚定地下了这样的结论：美国尚未做好网络之战的准备。

(Para. 3)这几个月以来，到处充斥着来自前任和现任国家安全官员的网络主战论。

Richard Clarke, a former cybersecurity adviser to two administrations, says in his new book that “cyberwar has already begun.” Testifying in Congress in February, Mike McConnell, former head of the National Security Agency, argued that “if we went to war today in a cyberwar, we would lose.” Speaking in late April, Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta said that “the next Pearl Harbor is likely to be a cyberattacking going after our grid.” 前两部门网络安全顾问理查德·克拉克在他最近的新书里提到：“网络战已经开始了。”前国家安全局的领导麦克·麦可科奈尔在二月召开的国会里说道：“倘若今天进入网络战，我们必输无疑。”四月，中央情报局理事里奥·番奈特说道：“下一个网络攻击的“珍珠港”事件很可能会进入我们的领地。”

(Para. 4)

近期对于谷歌的隐形侵袭过程只能加重公众的担忧。因为，在侵袭途中有人欺骗谷歌员工打开了未经允许的链接使得入侵者们进入了谷歌密码运行软件的部分区域。这些针对谷歌的恶性攻击事件增加了公众的恐慌情绪。

If the world s most innovative technology company cannot protect its computers from such digital aggression, what can we expect from the bureaucratic chimera that is the Department of Homeland Security?

如果连世界上最具创新性的技术公司都无法保护计算机免受诸如此类的网络侵略，我们还期望从本国安全部门，这个官僚政治的巨头那里得到什么？

(Para. 5)

谷歌应该为其声称自己受到网络攻击的行为得到掌声，而大多数公司面对这些事件时倾向于保持沉默。

But do hundreds—or even thousands—of such incidents that target both the private and the public sector add up to the imminent threat of a “cyberwar” that is worthy of such hype? The evidence so far looks too shaky.

但是成百上千甚至更多的这些以私人和公共部门为目标的攻击事件加起来就等于即将来临的危险——这个值得广泛宣传的网络战吗？证据显得如此不可靠。 (Para. 6)Ironically, the more we spend on securing the Internet, the less secure we appear to feel. 可笑的是，在网络防卫上投入得越多，我们就越觉得不安全。

A 2009 report by Input, a marketing intelligence firm, projected that government spending on cybersecurity would grow at a compound rate of 8.1% in the next five years. A March report from consulting firm Market Research Media estimates that the government s total spending on cybersecurity between now and 2015 is set to hit $55 billion, with strong growth predicted in areas such as Internet-traffic surveillance and monitoring.

一份2009年来自营销智囊团Input公司的报告预测在未来五年，政府花在网络安全上的经费将以8.1%的综合速度增长。另一份于3月出自顾问公司Market Research Media的报告估计从今年起到2015年政府用于网络安全的总费用将直逼550亿美元，其中预计诸如网络传输监控和追踪等领域增长尤为迅速。

(Para. 7) Given the previous history of excessively tight connections between our government and many of its contractors, it s quite possible that the over-dramatized rhetoric of those cheerleading the cyberwar has helped to add at least a few billion dollars to this price tag. Mr. McConnell's current employer, Booz Allen Hamilton, has just landed $34 million in cyber security contracts with the Air Force. In addition to writing books on the subject, Richard Clarke is a partner in a security firm, Good Harbor Consulting.

鉴于过去我们政府与它众多的承包商之间关系过分亲密的事情，那些花言巧语过

分鼓吹网络战的承包商完全可能使得费用至少增加几十亿。麦克·麦可科奈尔先生的现任雇主艾伦·汉密尔顿已经与空军签订价值三千四百万关于网络安全合同。除了写与网络安全相关的文章外，理查德·克拉克还是Good Harbor Consulting安全公司的成员之一。

(Para. 8a)麦克·麦可科奈尔与克拉克，甚至那些数不胜数的实现了成功过渡的人们，由于他们先确认了政府的网络安全问题紧接着为这些问题提供帮助，因此他们被誉为备受尊敬的专业人士，除此之外，如果仅仅因为他们见识过更加专业化的报道，他们的想法也不该被轻视。

(Para. 8b)Their stature, however, does not relieve them of the responsibility to provide some hard evidence to support their claims. We do not want to sleepwalk into a cyber-Katrina, but neither do we want to hold our policy-making hostage to the rhetorical ploys of better-informed government contractors.

然而，他们的高度水平也并没有就此减轻他们要为他们的观点提供可靠证据的责任感。我们不想抱着幻想投入到只有网络的生活当中，也不想将政策决定这个赌注放在消息灵通的政府合作者所持有的那些夸张的伎俩上面。

(Para. 9)Steven Walt, a professor of international politics at Harvard, believes that the nascent debate about cyberwar presents “a classical opportunity for threat inflation.” Mr Walt points to the resemblance between our current deliberations about online security and the debate about nuclear arms during the Cold War.

一名哈佛大学国际政治学教授斯蒂文·沃尔特认为关于网络战的初次讨论引出了一次绝佳的夸大危胁的机会。沃尔特先生指出我们现在关于网络安全的深思熟虑与在冷战时期关于核武器的热议的相似之处。

当时，从事武器与军事研究的人员比许多理论专家更倾向于杞人忧天的观点，显然是因为大学教授不需要依赖大肆宣传军备竞赛以谋求生计。

(Para. 10)Markus Ranum, a veteran of the network security industry and a noted critic of the cyber war hype, points to another similarity with the Cold War.

马科斯·冉讷姆是一位从事网络安全行业的内行人，也是著名的批判鼓吹网络战的人士。他指出网络战的热议与冷战的相似之处。

.”

他进一步说明今天关于网络战的大肆宣传会导致我们认为为了防御一个尚未到来的攻击，我们需要发展攻击能力。这是冷战时期“轰炸机代差”的重演。它只是一个为扩大军事化的脆弱的借口。

(Para. 11)How dire is the threat? Ask two experts and you will get different opinions. Just last month, Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, director of the NSA, told the Senate s Armed Services Committee that U.S. military networks were seeing “hundreds of thousands of probes a day.” However, speaking at a March conference in San Francisco, Howard Schmidt, Obama s recently appointed cybersecurity czar, said that “there is no cyberwar,” adding that it is “a terrible metaphor” and a “terrible concept.”

危险到底有多可怕？问问两位专家，你会得到两个完全不同的答案。就在上个月，NSA局长亚历山大向参议院的现役武装委员会报告，美国军网监测到每天有成百上千的入侵探测。但是，奥巴马最近任命网络安全负责人豪吾儿德·斯格梅特在旧金山的一个军事会议上说：“没有网络战”，他补充道，那是“可怕的比喻”和“骇人的概念”。

(Para. 12) The truth is, not surprisingly, somewhere in between. There is no doubt that the Internet brims with spamming, scamming and identity fraud.

不要感到惊讶，真相就在这两者之间的某个地方。毫无疑问，互联网充满着垃圾邮件、诡计以及骗子。

Having someone wipe out your hard drive or bank account has never been easier, and the tools for committing electronic mischief on your enemies are cheap and widely accessible. 人们从没有如此容易地擦除你的硬驱动器或者你的银行账目，而且用于给你的敌人制造电子故障的工具更加便宜和普遍。

(Para. 13)This is the inevitable cost of democratizing access to multi-purpose technologies. Just as any blogger can now act like an Ed Murrow, so can any armchair-bound cyberwarrior act like the über-hacker Kevin Mitnick, who was once America s most-wanted computer criminal and now runs a security consulting firm.

这是自由地使用多用途技术不可避免的代价。正如所有的博客现在都能够扮演爱德·莫罗的角色一样，所有不切实际鼓吹网络战的人都扮演曾经是美国最想缉拿归案的网络罪犯，而现今经营一家安全咨询公司的黑客凯文·米特尼克。

但是正如错误地推断媒体的成熟将会带来高质量新闻业的复兴，网络攻击的成熟将会带来一个具有破坏性网络战争的新的世界的推断也是错的。

(Para. 14)From a strictly military perspective, “cyberwar”—with a small “c”—may very

well exist, playing second fiddle to ongoing military conflict, the one with tanks, shellfire and all. The Internet—much like the possibility of air combat a century ago—has opened new possibilities for military operations: block the dictator s bank account or shut down his propaganda-infested broadcast media. Such options were already on the table—even though they appear to have been used sparingly— during a number of recent wars.

从严格的军事观点看，网络战将在现实中继续存在，扮演着一个仅次于正在进行中需要坦克、炮火和所有武器的军事斗争的角色。互联网就像一个世纪前的发生空中战争的可能，已为军事行动提供了新的可能：冻结独裁者的银行账目或者关闭宣传他主张的广播媒体。这些方式已在最近的一些战争中开始运用，虽然他们看起来似乎用的有点保守。

(Para. 15a)Why have such tactics—known in military parlance as “computer network attacks”—not been used more widely? As revolutionary as it is, the Internet does not make centuries-old laws of war obsolete or irrelevant. Military conventions, for example, require that attacks distinguish between civilian and military targets. In decentralized and interconnected cyberspace, this requirement is not so easy to satisfy: A cyberattack on a cellphone tower used by the adversary may affect civilian targets along with military ones. 为什么这些在军事领域里被认为是网络攻击的策略没有被广泛运用？正如革命，互联网并没有使悠久的战争规律变得过时或毫不相关。比如，按照军事惯例要求在攻击时区分平民和军事目标。在既相互分离又相互连接的电脑空间里，这个要求并不容易满足：在网络攻击敌人用的电话塔时影响平民目标和军事目标。 (Para. 15b)initially set up by the CIA to glean intelligence but increasingly used by the jihadists to plan on attacks in Iraq —A weapon of surgical precision the Internet certainly isn t, and damage to civilians is hard to avoid. Military commanders do not want to be tried for war crimes, even if those crimes are committed online.

在2008年美国军队决定拆除一个沙特阿拉伯的网络论坛。这个由CIA创立的论坛本来是用来收集人才的但是却越来越被异教徒用在伊拉克的攻击上。这次拆除不经意间造成在沙特阿拉伯、德国、德克萨斯州的300多台服务器的中断。网络攻击定然不是外科手术般的精确打击武器，且对平民的伤害很难避免。军事指挥官不想尝试战争犯罪的实验，即使是通过网络来实行犯罪。

(Para. 16)All of these distinct threats require quite distinct policy responses that can balance the risks with the levels of devastation. We probably want very strong protection against cyberterror, moderate protection against cybercrime, and little to no protection against juvenile cyber-hooliganism。

所有这些不同的威胁需要很不相同的能够平衡风险和毁坏水平的政策响应。我们

可能需要非常强的保护来对付网络恐怖分子，中等的保护来对付网络犯罪，很少或者没有保护来对付年少的网络流氓。

(Para. 17)Perfect security—in cyberspace or in the real world—has huge political and social costs, and most democratic societies would find it undesirable. Just like we don t put up armed guards to protect every city wall from graffiti, we should not overreact in cyberspace. 完美的安全无论是在网络空间还是在真实世界，需要巨大的政治和社会代价，大多数民主社会认为这是不可接受的。就像我们不会安排武装警卫保护每个城市的墙免受涂鸦一样，我们不应该在网络空间中采用过激行为。

(Para. 18)Recasting basic government problems in terms of a global cyber struggle won t make us any more secure. The real question is, “Why are government computers so vulnerable to very basic and unsophisticated threats?” This is not a question of national security; it is a question of basic government incompetence.

从全球网络战角度来改动基本的政府问题不会让我们感到更安全。真正的问题是“为什么政府计算机对于基本的不算复杂的威胁这样不堪一击？”这不是国家安全的问题，而是基本的政府无能的问题。

(Para. 19a)Thus, when a series of fairly unsophisticated attacks crashed the websites of 27 government agencies—including those of the Treasury Department, Secret Service and Transportation Department—during last year s July Fourth weekend, it was panic time. 因此，在去年7月第四个周末期间，当一系列相当简单的攻击使27家政府机构包括财政部，机密服务和运输部的网站瘫痪地时候，引起了一度恐慌。

(Para. 19b) But whoever was behind the attacks, it was not their sophistication or strength that crashed the government s websites. Network security firm Arbor Networks described the attacks as “pretty modest-sized.” What crashed the websites was the incompetence of the people who ran them. If “pretty modest-sized” attacks can cripple them, someone is not doing their job.

但无论发起攻击的背后的黑客是谁，都不是它的高超技术和力量击溃了政府网站。网络安全公司Arbor Networks描述道“攻击规模是中等的”。真正使网站崩溃的原因是运行它的人员的无能。如果连中等规模的攻击都能使它瘫痪，那么一定是有什么人没有履行好他们的职责。

(Para. 20)Urging China and Iran to keep their hands off the Internet would work only if Washington sticks to its own advice; otherwise, we are trading in hype.

更糟糕的是，任何对互联网进行大的改造可能会使美国政府充满雄心的主动精神出轨，尤其是它促进互联网自由的努力行为。只有在华盛顿坚持它自己的建议的

条件下敦促中国和伊朗远离互联网的行动才会见效，否则我们只会打宣传战。

(Para. 21)In reality, we don t need to develop a new set of fancy all-powerful weaponry to secure cyberspace. In most cases the threats are the same as they were 20 years ago; we still need to patch security flaws, update anti-virus databases and ban suspicious users from our sites. It s human nature, not the Internet, that we need to conquer and re-engineer to feel more secure.

实际上，我们不需要研发一套新的高级无敌的武器来确保网络空间的安全。在大部分情况下，威胁和二十年前一样，我们不过需要给安全漏洞打补丁，升级病毒库和禁止可疑的用户访问我们的网站。我们需要征服和再造人类本性而非互联网来增加安全感。

但是只有通过合理的商讨而非制造恐惧方可制定出能完成这个使命的政策。