文献出处：Beck T. The Study of Accounting Information Distortion in Small and Medium Enterprise [J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2014, 30(11): 30-43.

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原文

The Study of Accounting Information Distortion

In Small and Medium Enterprise

Author: Beck T.

Abstract

Security market, in fact, is information market, and the timeliness, fairness and completeness of account information is the foundation of public confidence to the market. The falsehood of accounting information strongly influents whether security market can work well. With introducing Coherence Theory and Procedural Rationality, the article redefines fairness and falsehood of accounting information, then analysis the issue from perspective of Game Theory.

As to the concept of fairness of accounting information, the article integrates Procedural Rationality with Coherence Theory. That is, the accounting information can be deemed true only if the procedure and institution of accounting rule-making are rational and the accounting information is produced and disclosed strictly according to the rules.

From previous definition, the falsehood of accounting information can be defined as following two: if the procedure and institution of accounting rule-making are irrational, the accounting information is in falsehood even though it is produce according to rules and standards. Besides, if the rules and standards are of high quality, but not obeyed, the accounting information is also in falsehood.

Keywords: Accounting Information, Game Theory, Procedural Rationality

Rationality is one of presumptions in economics, which means human beings always make decision which can maximum his or her interests. And the presumption restricts the areas, where the methods in economics can be used. Therefore, it is necessary to refine the study areas. The article is to study on the falsehood of accounting information induced by rule constitutors and executors who have incentive not to follow the procedure of rule-making and implementing when institution and procedure are irrational. According to categories of falsehood of accounting information, the article is focused on player’s actions and strategies under irrational institution and procedure which lead to the institutional and intended falsehood. So the behavioral falsehood and falsehood led by humane-beings’ limited rationality are excluded.

During the process of accounting rule-making, different game players have different claims for accounting information according to their own interests. They have their own payoff functions, and have different request for accounting standards. The parties will make the rules partial to themselves and advocate their own requests from their own position and interest. The ideal model for accounting rule making is cooperative game with Nash equilibrium of sub-game perfect-ness under dynamic and completely-informative environment. It is more costly for rational men to breaking the equilibrium than keeping under such circumstances. Then it becomes Pareto Perfection when nobody wants to break up. However, the ideal model is hard to attain. And conditions are needed to provide to get close to the ideal model. That is to say, a set of rational institution and procedure must be set up to guarantee all the decisions made by each player maximum the welfare of society. And the rationality of institution and procedure should be embodied by representation of rule-makers and independence of rule-making organization.

The structure of corporate governess comes from the conflicts within stockholders and the ones between shareholder and management. Accounting information is the warranty for shareholder to split up profits, and the

track record on management’s performance. In practice, it is common that management provides accounting information; controlling stockholders get more information at first place; and the potential investors decides their action by watching the movement of stock price and controlling shareholders. The features of the phenomenon are as follow: there is no perfect information between players, the game process is dynamic. Based on these features, the author builds up dynamic model with imperfect information, and makes the conclusion that minority only cares about the payoff of majority, the majority considers their own interest and the payoff of the management, the management needs to think of the payoff of the majority, the minority and their own. The factors influencing their actions are given. In reality, it is impossible for government regulatory department and the management to make a coalition. And the sequence of the game is not as clear as the one in the game between shareholders and management.

Therefore, a static model with imperfect information is founded. Deducing from the model, government regulatory department can ensure the fairness of accounting information by enhancing efforts in supervising, raising the social benefits and rewards of effective efforts, increasing the punishment of disclosing false accounting information and so on.

During the game between management and auditors, currently, the management provides information at first, and then auditor conducts auditing and present auditing statement. There is a clear sequence in the game. And a dynamic model with imperfect information is built up. We concludes that raising the punishment, enhancing the efforts in inspecting and other measures can be done to guarantee the quality …… 此处隐藏：10818字，全部文档内容请下载后查看。喜欢就下载吧 ……